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SYMPOSIUM: THE OSCEOLA +
INTRODUCTION: THE OSCEOLA AFTER 100 YEARS: ITS
MEANING AND EFFECT ON MARITIME PERSONAL
INJURY LAW IN THE UNITED STATES
Craig H. Allen*
I. INTRODUCTION
A century ago the United States Supreme Court issued its decision in
The Osceola,1 announcing four legal propositions that controlled personal
injury claims by seamen at the time. On the 100th anniversary of the Court's
decision, the four admiralty law professors contributing to this symposium
take the opportunity to critically examine the Court's renowned decision,
Congress' responses to the decision, and the effect of both The Osceola's
four propositions and the responsive legislation on the remedies available to
injured maritime workers in the 21st century. In the first of the three articles
that follow, Professor Steven Friedell mines the archival record behind this
important decision to reveal numerous factual aspects of the case that were,
until now, largely overlooked or misstated by the official reports. Professor
Joel Goldstein then scrutinizes the reasoning and support for each of the
case's famous four propositions, noting the Court's comparative law
approach, the effect of the four propositions on uniformity in maritime law
and also their summary, even elliptical, phraseology. In the third article,
Dean Thomas Galligan takes aim at the fourth of The Osceola's
propositions, revealing its illogic and its failure to promote the exercise of
due care by ship masters and fellow servants. Dean Galligan demonstrates
why those who believe the Jones Act rendered The Osceola irrelevant to a
contemporary maritime personal injury claim should reconsider.
11. BACKGROUND: THE FEDERAL ROLE IN MARITIME LAW
To evaluate the modem relevancy of The Osceola, it is important first to
understand the federal role in shaping maritime law and in adjudicating
cases falling within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. Article In of the
+ Note: The contributors presented this Symposium at the American Association of
Law Schools, Maritime Law Section annual meeting in Washington, D.C. on January 5, 2003.
* Professor of Law, University of Washington, Seattle, WA.
1. 189 U.S. 158 (1903).
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United States Constitution prescribes the judicial power of the United States.
That power includes jurisdiction over several categories of cases or
controversies, including those arising under the Constitution, federal law, or
treaties, and those in which the parties are diverse.2 In neither of those two
jurisdictional bases is the substantive law applied to resolve the case created
by the federal courts. In so-called federal question cases, the substantive law
is found in the Constitution itself, or in international agreements, statutes or
regulations prescribed or entered into by the legislative and executive
branches. However, in "diversity" cases, the Supreme Court made clear in its
1938 decision in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,3 that state law, both
statutory and common law, provides the rule of decision for the federal
courts.
In contrast to the federal question and diversity jurisdiction clauses, the
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction clause in Article II has been held to
confer three distinct powers, including legislative power. Justice Felix
Frankfurter summarized these powers in Romero v. International Terminal
Operating Co. :4
Article III, § 2, cl. 1 (3d provision) of the Constitution and section 9 of the
Act of September 24, 1789, have from the beginning been the sources of
jurisdiction in litigation based upon federal maritime law. Article III
impliedly contained three grants. (1) It empowered Congress to confer
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction on the "[t]ribunals inferior to the
[S]upreme Court" which were authorized by Art. I, § 8, cl 9. (2) It
empowered the federal courts in their exercise of the admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction which had been conferred on them, to draw on the substantive
law "inherent in the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction" . . . and to continue
the development of this law within constitutional limits. (3) It empowered
Congress to revise and supplement the maritime law within the limits of the
Constitution.
5
2. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
3. 304 U.S. 64 (1938); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2000) (providing that, except where
the Constitution, treaties or federal statutes otherwise require or provide, state law provides
the rule of decision for federal courts).
4. 358 U.S. 354 (1959); see also Brainerd Currie, The Silver Oar and All That: A
Study of the Romero Case, 27 U. CHI. L. REv. 1 (1959).
5. Romero, 358 U.S. at 360-61 (citations omitted).
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The Court had earlier acknowledged Congress' Article II legislative
power in Crowell v. Benson.6 In upholding the constitutionality of what was
then called the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act,
7
Chief Justice Hughes explained:
As the Act relates solely to injuries occurring upon the navigable waters of
the United States, it deals with the maritime law, applicable to matters that
fall within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction (Const. Art. III, § 2 ... )
and the general authority of the Congress to alter or revise the maritime law
which shall prevail throughout the country is beyond dispute.
8
Modernly, it seems unlikely, in view of the broad construction given to the
Article I, Section 8 interstate and foreign commerce power, that Congress
would need to rely on its implied Article II power to enact legislation
prescribing the standard of liability in maritime personal injury or wrongful
death claims.
9
As authors of the general maritime law, 10 the federal courts developed
several key aspects of maritime personal injury law well before The Osceola
was decided in 1903. Even those early cases recognized that the liability
regime varied according to the injured person's status. Justice Joseph Story's
important contributions to seaman personal injury law in those early cases
will be described below. In Leathers v. Blessing, 11 the Supreme Court held
in 1881 that admiralty provided a cause of action for a visitor who was
6. 285 U.S. 22 (1932). That Court had earlier upheld industrial accident legislation for
seamen. See Panama R.R. Co. v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 375 (1924) (upholding constitutionality
of the Jones Act).
7. Act of March 4, 1927, ch. 509, 44 Stat. 1424 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§
901-950 (2000)). The Act was re-named the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation
Act [hereinafter LHWCA] in 1984. Pub. L. No. 98-426, 98 Stat. 1639, 1654 (1984).
8. Crowell, 285 U.S. at 39 (citations omitted).
9. Nevertheless, the lower courts continued to rely on the implied Article III power of
Congress in upholding the 1972 amendments to the LHWCA, which extended the Act's
coverage to injuries sustained by covered workers in certain locations "adjacent to" the
navigable waters. See, e.g., Alabama Dry Dock & Shipbuilding Co. v. Kininess, 554 F.2d 176,
178-79 (5th Cir. 1977).
10. Despite the Supreme Court's recognition of the legitimacy of a general maritime law
fashioned by federal judges both before and after the Court's 1938 Erie decision, some still
question the constitutionality of any federal common law. See, e.g., MARTIN H. REnISH,
FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF FEDERAL PowER 140 (2d ed. 1990).
11. 105 U.S. 626 (1881). The Court would later hold that the shipowner owed such
persons a duty of reasonable care under the circumstances. Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale
Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625 (1959).
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injured while on board a moored vessel due to the master's negligence. 12 In
The Max Morris v. Curry,13 the Court held in 1890 that a longshore
worker's contributory negligence was not a complete bar to recovery, when
he was injured while loading coal on a vessel. 14
As the substantive maritime law developed over the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries, two conflict dimensions emerged. The first is the
ongoing "vertical" conflict between federal and state law, which was
characterized as diabolically messy in a widely cited 1960 article by
Professor David Currie. 15 The second concerns a more subtle, but
increasingly important, "horizontal" conflict between the coordinate
branches of the federal government, which operates under the rubric of
separation of powers and its corollary principle of legislative supremacy
over the courts in matters of substantive law.
A. Federalism and the Vertical Conflict Dimension
The respective roles of the federal and state governments are established
through express and implied constitutional provisions. Where the federal
constitution, a treaty, or a federal statute or regulation provides the rule of
law, the federal rule prevails over any conflicting state rule by operation of
the Supremacy Clause in Article VI of the Constitution. As a matter of
constitutional case law, largely founded on non-textual arguments, the
judge-made general maritime law also displaces conflicting state law. 16 For
12. Leathers, 105 U.S. at 629-30.
13. 137 U.S. 1 (1890). The Court adverted to The Schooner Catherine v. Dickinson, 58
U.S. (17 How.) 170 (1854), a collision case, in which the Court held thirty-five years earlier
that damages should be divided equally in cases involving mutual fault.
14. The Max Morris, 137 U.S. at 15. In The Ances, 93 F. 240 (4th Cir. 1899), the court
recognized an injured longshore worker's right to proceed in rem against a vessel on which
the worker was injured due to the alleged negligence and incompetence of a winch operator
employed by the ship's officer. The court's reasoning clearly suggests that the basis for the
claim was negligent misuse of a proper appliance, not an unseaworthy condition.
15. David P. Currie, Federalism and the Admiralty: "The Devil's Own Mess," 1960
SUP. CT. REV. 158.
16. The notion that a judge-made federal common law of admiralty displaces state law
has been criticized. See, e.g., Ernest A. Young, The Last Brooding Omnipresence: Erie
Railroad Co. v. Tompkins and the Unconstitutionality of Preemptive Federal Maritime Law,
43 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1349 (1999). A similar criticism has been leveled at the proposition that
customary international law displaces state law. Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith,
Customary International Law as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position,
110 HARV. L. REV. 815 (1997).
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example, in its 1875 decision in The Lottawanna,17 reviewing the validity of
a state's lien law, the Court observed:
That we have a maritime law of our own, operative throughout the United
States, cannot be doubted. The general system of maritime law which was
familiar to the lawyers and statesmen of the country when the Constitution
was adopted, was most certainly intended and referred to when it was
declared in that instrument that the judicial power of the United States shall
extend "to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction."
One thing, however, is unquestionable; the Constitution must have referred
to a system of law coextensive with, and operating uniformly in, the whole
country. It certainly could not have been the intention to place the rules and
limits of maritime law under the disposal and regulation of the several
States, as that would have defeated the uniformity and consistency at which
the Constitution aimed on all subjects of a commercial character affecting
the intercourse of the States with each other or with foreign states. 
18
In the Judiciary Act of 1789, the first Congress chose to make federal
judicial jurisdiction concurrent with the states in most cases falling within
the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. 19 The effect of the so-called "saving
to suitors clause" is to provide the plaintiff bringing most in personam
claims falling within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction with three
forum options: (1) suit in an appropriate federal district court on the
"admiralty side," under 28 U.S.C. § 1333; (2) suit in an appropriate federal
district court on the "law side," with a right of trial by jury, if the suit meets
the requirements for federal question jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, or
diversity of citizenship jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1332; or (3) suit in an
appropriate state court. Actions to enforce a maritime lien through an in rem
action are, however, exclusively within the federal admiralty court's
jurisdiction. 20
17. 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 558 (1874).
18. Id. at 574-75.
19. Act of Sep. 24, 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 76. Section 9 of the Act, often referred to as the
"saving to suitors clause," provided that the federal district courts shall have "exclusive
original cognizance of all civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction ... saving to
suitors, in all cases, the right of a common law remedy, where the common law is competent
to give it." The present version is codified as amended in 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1) (2000).
20. The Moses Taylor, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 411 (1867).
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Until the early part of the twentieth century most courts assumed that the
states' concurrent jurisdiction implied that the state was free to apply its own
substantive law to cases falling within the admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction. 21 The Supreme Court put an end to that practice in a series of
cases handed down from 1917 through the 1950s. 22 In 1918, for example,
the Court held in Chelentis v. Luckenbach Steamship Co.,23 that federal
maritime law, not state common law, governed liability in seaman personal
injury cases, notwithstanding the "saving to suitors" clause's option to bring
the claim in a state court.24 Modernly, just as the Supreme Court's decision
in Erie requires federal courts to apply state law in cases arising under the
court's diversity jurisdiction, the Court has recognized a "reverse-Erie"
doctrine that requires state courts to apply federal substantive law in cases
arising under federal law, including federal maritime law.25
21. For example, see then-Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Judge O.W. Holmes'
opinion in Kalleck v. Deering, 37 N.E. 450, 452 (Mass. 1894), which upheld the application
of state common law to a personal injury claim within admiralty jurisdiction despite its
conflict with substantive federal admiralty rule. As a U.S. Supreme Court Associate Justice,
Holmes reiterated his views on the role of state law in his dissent in Southern Pacific Co. v.
Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 218-23 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (citing, among other cases,
Belden v. Chase, 150 U.S. 674, 691 (1893)).
22. The watershed 1917 decision was Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205
(1917), in which the Court struck down the New York Court of Appeals decision affirming a
worker's compensation award to the family of a fatally injured longshoreman.
23. 247 U.S. 372, 382 (1918) (holding that "no state has power to abolish the well
recognized maritime rule concerning measure of recovery and substitute therefor the full
indemnity rule of the common law"). The Chelentis holding was later applied in Garrett v.
Moore-McCormack Co., Inc., 317 U.S. 239, 248-49 (1942) (holding that federal maritime
law, not state law, governs question of which party has the burden of proof on releases by
injured seamen), Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406, 409 (1953) (holding that state
rule of contributory negligence does not apply to harbor worker's claim for personal injury),
and Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625, 628-29 (1959)
(rejecting application of state law to claim by visitor injured on board vessel on navigable
waters).
24. Some have argued that Chelentis cannot be reconciled with the Court's earlier
decision in Homer Ramsdell Transportation Co. v. La Compagnie Generale Transatlantique,
182 U.S. 406 (1901), which applied common law respondeat superior principles to hold that
a vessel owner was not vicariously liable for the torts of a compulsory pilot. Closer inspection
reveals that the claim in Homer Ramsdell concerned a ship-to-shore tort, which under the
then-controlling rule in The Plymouth, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 20 (1866), was not within admiralty
jurisdiction and was therefore governed by the common law. The Admiralty Extension Act of
1940, presently codified at 46 U.S.C. app. § 740 (2000), later extended admiralty jurisdiction
to such claims.




Until quite recently, the Supreme Court's decisions on the reach of
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction turned in part on the belief that cases
falling within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction would be resolved by
application of substantive maritime law. For example, in Foremost
Insurance Co. v. Richardson,26 Justice Marshall reasoned on behalf of the
five-member majority that "[t]he federal interest in protecting maritime
commerce cannot be adequately served if admiralty jurisdiction is restricted
to those individuals engaged in commercial maritime activity. This interest
can be fully vindicated only if all operators of vessels on navigable waters
are subject to uniform rules of conduct."
'27
In East River Steamship Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc.,28 the
Court similarly remarked that "[w]ith admiralty jurisdiction comes the
application of substantive maritime law." 29 Less than a decade later, the
Court began to back away from that position. In Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v.
Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co.,30 the Court rejected the City of Chicago's
argument that if the Court were to hold that the case fell within the admiralty
jurisdiction, substantive admiralty law would automatically displace state
law. Writing for the majority, Justice Souter explained that to characterize
admiralty law as:
"federal rules of decision" . . . is "a destructive oversimplification of the
highly intricate interplay of the States and the National Government in their
regulation of maritime commerce. It is true that state law must yield to the
[t]he "saving to suitors" clause allows state courts to entertain in personam maritime
causes of action, but in such cases the extent to which state law may be used to
remedy maritime injuries is constrained by a so-called "reverse-Erie" doctrine which
requires that the substantive remedies afforded by the States conform to governing
federal maritime standards.
Id. at 222-23 (citations omitted).
26. 457 U.S. 668 (1982).
27. Id. at 674-75. As the dissenters noted, the underlying struggle was primarily over
choice of law. Id. at 677-78 (Powell, J., dissenting). Under Louisiana law at the time,
contributory negligence was a complete defense (see FRANK L. MARAIST & THOMAS C.
GALUJGAN, JR., LOUISIANA TORT LAW § 9.01 (1996) (describing the Louisiana rule before
1980)), while admiralty followed the rule of comparative fault. The four dissenters argued that
"[t]he issue is whether the federal law of admiralty law, rather than traditional state tort law,
should apply to an accident on the Amite River in Louisiana between two small boats." Id. at
678 (Powell, J., dissenting).
28. 476 U.S. 858, 864 (1986).
29. Id. at 864.
30. 513 U.S. 527 (1995).
20031
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needs of a uniform federal maritime law when this Court finds inroads on a
harmonious system. But this limitation still leaves the States a wide scope."
3 1
The decision to decouple jurisdiction and choice of law was further
refined in the Court's decision in Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A. v. Calhoun,
32
in which the Court upheld application of state substantive laws on remedies,
to claims by the parents of a 12-year old girl who was fatally injured when
her personal watercraft collided with an anchored boat in the navigable
waters of Puerto Rico.3 3 The Supreme Court left open the question whether
state or federal law would govern questions of liability. On remand, the
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that federal law controlled
questions of liability, and the Supreme Court denied certiorari without
comment.
34
B. The Separation of Powers Dimension: From Judicial to Legislative
Primacy
As the general maritime law on personal injury developed, it was shaped
by a number of policies. Perhaps the best-known policy is Justice Joseph
Story's "seamen-are-wards-of-admiralty" rationale in Harden v. Gordon.
35
Harden, the mate on a vessel owned and commanded by Gordon, brought a
claim for wages after a voyage between Portland, Maine and Guadeloupe, in
the West Indies. Gordon had deducted the expenses incurred for Harden's
medical treatment while in a port during the voyage. In holding that the
medical care expense should be borne by the shipowner rather than the
seaman, Justice Story wrote:
Seamen are by the peculiarity of their lives liable to sudden sickness from
change of climate, exposure to perils, and exhausting labour. They are
generally poor and friendless, and acquire habits of gross indulgence,
carelessness, and improvidence. If some provision be not made for them in
31. Id. at 545-46 (quoting Romero v. Int'l Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 373
(1959)).
32. 516U.S. 199 (1996).
33. Id. at 201-02. But see In re Amtrack [sic] "Sunset Limited," 121 F.3d 1421, 1423-
24 (11 th Cir. 1997) (holding that, notwithstanding the Supreme Court's decision in Calhoun,
general maritime law, not Alabama state law, governs remedies available in wrongful death
claims by survivors of train passengers killed following a tug's collision with a railroad
bridge), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 110 (1998).
34. 216 F.3d 338 (3d Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1037 (2000).
35. 11 F. Cas. 480 (C.C.D. Me. 1823) (No. 6,047).
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sickness at the expense of the ship, they must often in foreign ports suffer the
accumulated evils of disease, and poverty....
Every court should watch with jealousy an encroachment upon the rights
of seamen, because they are unprotected and need counsel; because they are
thoughtless and require indulgence; because they are credulous and
complying; and are easily overreached. But courts of maritime law have been
in the constant habit of extending towards them a peculiar, protecting favor
and guardianship. They are emphatically the wards of admiralty; and though
not technically incapable of entering into a valid contract, they are treated in
the same manner as courts of equity are accustomed to treat young
heirs .... 36
In holding in The Sea Gull37 that the admiralty court had jurisdiction
over a wrongful death claim brought by the husband of a woman killed in a
collision, Chief Justice Chase, sitting as circuit justice, articulated a second
often-heard policy, reasoning: "[C]ertainly it better becomes the humane and
liberal character of proceedings in admiralty to give than to withhold the
remedy, when not required to withhold it by established and inflexible
rules." 3
8
The modem Supreme Court has repeatedly stressed that Congress has
superior authority over the development of maritime law. In the first edition
of their admiralty treatise, Professors Gilmore and Black described the
Supreme Court's role in liberalizing maritime worker remedies since 1940 as
having gone so far that "it is clear that a revolution has taken place."' 39 As
late as 1975, the highly-respected authors could still conclude in their second
edition that, despite occasional setbacks, a majority of the Court had
remained "faithful to the revolution which had been wrought from the
1940's on."' 40 If that were so in 1975, it now seems equally clear that the
revolution has quietly died out, or at the very least has taken on a new cause.
Recent cases by the Supreme Court are marked by substantial deference to
36. Id. at 483, 485.
37. 21 F. Cas. 909 (C.C.D. Md. 1865) (No. 12,578).
38. Id. at 910. Chief Justice Chase's wrongful death holding was short-lived. The
Supreme Court later ruled in The Harrisburg, 119 U.S. 199 (1886), that admiralty provided
no wrongful death cause of action in the absence of statute. The Harrisburg was overruled
almost a century later in Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970).
39. GRANT GnimoRE & CHARLEs L. BLACK, JR., THE LAw OF ADMIRALTY § 6-1, at 248
(Ist ed. 1957).
40. GRANT GiLMoRE & CHARLEs L. BLACK, JR., THE LAW OF ADMiRALTY § 6-1(a), at
272 (2d ed. 1975).
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Congress' role in fashioning maritime law. As Justice O'Connor explained
in Miles v. Apex Marine Corp.:
4 1
We no longer live in an era when seamen and their loved ones must look
primarily to the courts as a source of substantive legal protection from injury
and death; Congress and the States have legislated extensively in these areas.
In this era, an admiralty court should look primarily to these legislative
enactments for policy guidance. We may supplement these statutory remedies
where doing so would achieve the uniform vindication of such policies
consistent with our constitutional mandate, but we must also keep strictly
within the limits imposed by Congress. Congress retains superior authority in
these matters, and an admiralty court must be vigilant not to overstep the
well-considered boundaries imposed by federal legislation.
42
The modem Court's narrow view of the judiciary's role in progressive
development of maritime law is not without its critics, including one who
would likely be deemed by the admiralty bench and bar as the modem jurist
who was, in his time, best qualified to instruct the federal judiciary on the
vital role admiralty judges serve in developing maritime law in the U.S.
43
III. THE OSCEOLA DECISION
Any examination of the law should begin with consideration of the
historical context. In 1903, 44 when The Osceola was decided, the Victorian
era had just come to an end. President Theodore Roosevelt was in the White
House. The Industrial Revolution was well underway. Upton Sinclair would
shortly expose the darker side of that revolution in his book, The Jungle. The
fictional characters of Joseph Conrad and Jack London provided readers
with poignant insight into the seaman's life. Steam had largely displaced sail
as the principal means of propulsion for vessels. The U.S. Transcontinental
41. 498 U.S. 19 (1990).
42. Id. at 28; see also Norfolk Shipbuilding & Drydock Corp. v. Garris, 532 U.S. 811,
820 (2001) (reasoning that "[b]ecause of Congress's extensive involvement in legislating
causes of action for maritime personal injuries, it will be the better course, in many cases that
assert new claims beyond what those statutes have seen fit to allow, to leave further
development to Congress").
43. John R. Brown, Admiralty Judges: Flotsam on the Sea of Maritime Law?, 24 J.
MAR. L. & COM. 249 (1993).
44. See generally THE ANNALS OF AMERICA, Vol. 12: 1895-1906 (Encyclopedia
Britannica 1968); BERNARD GRUN, THE TIMETABLES OF HISTORY (3d ed. 1991); and BERNARD
SCHWARTZ, A HISTORY OF ThE SUPREME COURT (1993).
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Railroad and the Suez Canal had been in operation for more than thirty
years. The Senate gave its approval to the Panama Canal treaty that year, and
Roosevelt would soon begin work on the canal. 1903 also witnessed the
Wright Brothers complete their first successful flight of a motorized
airplane. The population of the United States, which by then consisted of 45
states, was in the neighborhood of 80 million. A steady stream of
immigrants, many of whom paid $10 for space in a trans-Atlantic vessel's
"steerage" compartment for a journey that would end at Ellis Island,
promised to increase that number. Maritime commerce on the Great Lakes
and western rivers had been steadily growing for more than 50 years. The
Supreme Court still met in the old Senate chamber of the Capitol, where it
had been since 1860. It would not move to its present location until 1935.
Melville W. Fuller, described by many, including Justice Holmes, as a very
effective chief justice, presided over the Court.
The Court's decision in The Osceola arose out of an injury to Patrick
Shea, a crewman employed on board the captioned steamship, which
operated on the Great Lakes. 45 From the facts available (as considerably
supplemented through Professor's Friedell's research) it seems plain that
Shea, although a "coal passer," met the then-existing test for seaman status,
in that he was possessed of the skills to "hand, reef and steer" 46 the vessel.
In December of 1896, when the Osceola was roughly three miles offshore in
Lake Michigan and approaching the port of Milwaukee, the master of the
vessel ordered the crew to make ready the forward port gangway, to expedite
the discharge of cargo upon arrival. Shea was among the crewmen ordered to
assist. The vessel was making 11 miles per hour and facing a head wind of 8
miles per hour when the crew began to hoist the gangway using a derrick
crane. As soon as the gangway swung clear of the ship's side, it was caught
by the wind and pushed aft, pulling the derrick over. The falling derrick
struck and injured Shea.
Shea sued the vessel in rem in the federal district court for the Eastern
District of Wisconsin, alleging (according to the Supreme Court's report)
that his injury was caused by the master's negligence. Shea's in rem claim
relied in part on a Wisconsin liability statute, which Shea apparently argued
conferred a lien on the vessel. 47 At the time of the suit, state home-port lien
45. Some of the details of the case are taken from Jo Desha Lucas, Flood Tide: Some
Irrelevant History of the Admiralty, 1964 SuP. CT. REv. 249, 262-84.
46. The Canton, 5 F. Cas. 29, 30 (D. Mass. 1858) (No. 2,388).
47. Wisc. STAT. § 3348 (1898) provided in part, that ships navigating in state waters
were liable for all damages arising from injures done to persons or property by such ship and
created a lien on the vessel in favor of the injured party. The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158, 164
20031
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statutes were generally enforceable. 48 The district court entered judgment
for Shea. The shipowners appealed to the circuit court. The circuit court in
turn certified three questions to the U.S. Supreme Court:
First. Whether the vessel is responsible for injuries happening to one of the
crew by reason of an improvident and negligent order of the master in respect
of the navigation and management of the vessel.
Second. Whether in the navigation and management of a vessel, the master of
the vessel and the crew are fellow servants.
Third. Whether as a matter of law the vessel or its owners are liable to the
appellee, Patrick Shea, who was one of the crew of the vessel, for the injury
sustained by him by reason of the improvident and negligent order of the
master of the vessel in ordering and directing the hoisting of the gangway at
the time and under the circumstances declared; that is to say, on the
assumption that the order so made was improvident and negligent.
4 9
Associate Justice Henry Billings Brown wrote the opinion for a
unanimous court.50 Justice Brown had been a federal district judge in
Michigan from 1875 until 1890, when President Benjamin Harrison
appointed him to the Supreme Court. He served on the Supreme Court from
1890 to 1906. Justice Brown was also the compiler of Brown's Admiralty
Reports,5 1 and the author of an early admiralty casebook 5 2 that he used in
(1903). By federal statute enacted in 1845, certain admiralty cases arising on the Great Lakes
may be tried to a jury. Act of Feb. 26, 1845, ch. 20, 5 Stat. 726 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1873
(2000)). Thus, by bringing his case in admiralty, Shea did not necessarily sacrifice the
opportunity to have his case tried before a jury.
48. State home-port lien statutes were intended to fill the gap in federal maritime law
created by the Supreme Court's decision in The General Smith, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 438, 443
(1819) (holding that recovery for repairs or necessaries provided to a vessel in her homeport
"is governed altogether by the municipal law of that state; and no lien is implied, unless it is
recognised by that law"). The home-port lien bar was eventually abolished by federal statute
and state statutes purporting to confer a lien on vessels for necessaries provided to the vessel
are no longer enforceable by in rem action in admiralty. See 46 U.S.C. § 31307 (2000).
49. The Osceola, 189 U.S. at 160.
50. Aspects of the Court's decision and its effect were reviewed in several
contemporary law review articles. See Frederic Cunningham, The Extension to the Admiralty
of the Fellow Servant Doctrine, 18 HARv. L. REv. 294 (1904-05); Fitz-Henry Smith, Jr.,
Liability in the Admiralty for Injuries to Seamen, 19 HARv. L. REv. 418 (1905-06); Frederick
Cunningham, Respondeat Superior in Admiralty, 19 HARv. L. REv. 445 (1905-06).
51. HENRY B. BROWN, REPORTS OF ADMIRALTY AND REVENUE CASES ARGUED AND
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connection with his lectures on admiralty at the Georgetown University
School of Law. Labeled a "particularly learned" admiralty judge, Justice
Henry B. Brown, along with Judge Addison Brown, who served with
distinction in the Southern District of New York from 1881 to 1901, and the
admiralty treatise author Arthur Browne created what one commentator has
called a fertile "brown period of U.S. admiralty" law. 53 In 1898, Justice
Brown authored the Court's decision in The Elfrida,54 the leading case in
the nation on the enforceability of contracts for marine salvage. 55 In 1901,
he wrote the Court's path-breaking decision in The Barnstable, in which the
court imposed in rem liability upon a vessel for conduct by persons for
whom the owner of the vessel bore no vicarious liability.56
In the Court's decision in The Osceola, Justice Brown wrote that the
question whether the vessel was liable turned on whether Shea had a lien on
the vessel under the general maritime law or the Wisconsin statute.57 In
disposing of The Osceola case as it did, the Court found it "necessary to
express an opinion only upon the first and third questions" certified by the
circuit court.58 After a fairly lengthy examination of federal, state and
English cases, the Court announced its famous four propositions:
[wie think the law may be considered as settled upon the following
propositions:
DETERMINED IN THE CIRcurr AND DISTRICT COURTS OF THE UNrrED STATES FOR THE WESTERN
LAKE AND RIVER DISTRICTS [1856-1875] (1876).
52. HENRY B. BROWN, CASES ON THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY (1896).
53. David J. Sharpe, The Future of Maritime Law in the Federal Courts: A Faculty
Colloquium: Admiralty Procedure, 31 J. MAR. L. & CoM. 217, 220 (2000). On the same day
The Osceola decision came down, the Court decided The Roanoke, 189 U.S. 185 (1903),
which was also written by Justice Brown. The Roanoke rejected application of a Washington
state lien statute to a vessel home-ported in Chicago. The decision announces, in language
very close to that used in The Osceola, that "the following [three] propositions may be
considered as settled." Id. at 193.
54. 172 U.S. 186 (1898).
55. Modernly, grounds for setting aside a contract for salvage are governed by Article 7
of the 1989 International Convention on Salvage. S. ExEc. REP. No. 102-17 (1991) (entered
into force July 14, 1996).
56. 181 U.S. 464 (1901). At the time of the collision the Barnstable was under a demise
charter, by which the owner chartered (leased) the vessel to a charterer/lessee. Id. at 465. The
master and crew on the vessel were employed by the charterer/lessee. Id. Accordingly, the
owner of the vessel was not vicariously liable for their torts. id. Nevertheless, the Court held
that the vessel was liable in rem for harm caused by the crew's negligence. Id. at 471.




1. That the vessel and her owners are liable, in case a seaman falls sick, or is
wounded, in the service of the ship, to the extent of his maintenance and cure,
and to his wages, at least so long as the voyage is continued.
2. That the vessel and her owner are, both by English and American law,
liable to an indemnity for injuries received by seamen in consequence of the
unseaworthiness of the ship, or a failure to supply and keep in order the
proper appliances appurtenant to the ship.
3. That all the members of the crew, except perhaps the master, are, as
between themselves, fellow servants, and hence seamen cannot recover for
injuries sustained through the negligence of another member of the crew
beyond the expense of their maintenance and cure.
4. That the seaman is not allowed to recover an indemnity for the negligence
of the master, or any member of the crew, but is entitled to maintenance and
cure, whether the injuries were received by negligence or accident.5 9
Upon receiving answers to the certified questions, the circuit court reversed
the district court and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss the
libel.
6 0
As framed by the Supreme Court, Shea's suit against The Osceola was
predicated solely on negligence grounds; therefore, the first and second
propositions are plainly dicta.6 1 The third proposition, which answers the
second question certified by the circuit court, adopted the fellow servant rule
that had prevailed in the common law since 1837.62 The fourth proposition,
the true holding of the decision, temporarily shut the door on claims in
59. Id. at 175 (citations omitted).
60. Bottsford v. Shea, 125 F. 1000, 1000-01 (7th Cir. 1903). Botsford (and others)
intervened as owners of the Osceola. Id. at 1000.
61. The maintenance and cure remedy under the general maritime law was later partially
codified in the Shipowners' Liability (Sick and Injured Seamen) Convention (I.L.O.
Convention No. 55), adopted, Geneva, Oct. 24, 1936, T.S. No. 951, 40 U.N.T.S. 169 (entered
into force, Oct. 29, 1938). President Roosevelt proclaimed the convention in 1939. See 54
Stat. 1693; see also Warren v. United States, 340 U.S. 523 (1951) (acknowledging U.S.
adherence to the convention, but ultimately basing its decision on general maritime law
principles).
62. See Priestly v. Fowler, 150 Eng. Rep. 1030 (Ex. D. 1837). Congress answered the
question whether the fellow servant rule extended to the master in the negative in 1915. See
infra note 78 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court held that "full effect must be given
this whenever the relationship between such parties becomes important." Chelentis v.
Luckenbach S.S. Co., 247 U.S. 372, 384 (1918).
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admiralty for seamen injured by negligence of the master or fellow
crewmembers. The Supreme Court later held in Chelentis that seamen were
similarly barred from asserting such negligence claims under the common
law. 63 Dean Galligan's article in this Symposium critically examines this
fourth proposition.
Though the Court in The Osceola imported the fellow servant defense
into seaman injury claims through the third proposition (at least for all but
the master), it did not mention the contributory negligence or assumption of
risk defenses. In The Max Morris, the Court had earlier held that
contributory negligence by an injured longshore worker would reduce, but
not bar, the plaintiffs recovery. 64 One year after The Osceola was handed
down, the Court, again through Justice Brown, observed in The Iroquois:65
"A seafaring life is a dangerous one, accidents of this kind are peculiarly
liable to occur, and the general principle of law that a person entering a
dangerous employment is regarded as assuming the ordinary risks of such
employment is peculiarly applicable to the case of seamen." 6
6
Despite the assumption of risk dictum, the Court in The Iroquois went
on to hold that the vessel had a duty to put in at the first available port if
necessary to provide prompt and adequate maintenance and cure to a seaman
who is injured during the voyage. 67
IV. THE CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE
Supreme Court decisions in the early 1900s initially left shore-based and
ship-based maritime workers with a fractured and inconsistent recovery
regime that many felt only Congress could address. Shore-based maritime
63. See Lucas, supra note 45, at 288; see also Carlisle Packing Co. v. Sandanger, 259
U.S. 255 (1922) (holding that state court erred in instructing jury on negligence theory in case
involving seaman's personal injury claim against vessel owner, but that error was harmless
because liability existed independently for breach of duty to provide seaworthy vessel).
64. 137 U.S. 1. The Court left open the question whether the damages would be divided
equally or by some proportion. Id. at 15. The Court later held in Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn,
346 U.S. 406 (1953), that, notwithstanding the Court's earlier decision in Erie, a state
contributory negligence bar to recovery was inapplicable in such cases when brought in
federal court under diversity jurisdiction.
65. 194 U.S. 240 (1904). The case concerned a claim by a seaman whose leg was
broken in a fall during a voyage while the vessel was off the southern tip of South America.
Id. at 240. The master had the leg splinted and continued on to San Francisco. Id. The leg
failed to heal and later required amputation. Id. at 241.
66. Id. at 243.
67. Id. at 246-48.
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workers, the longshore and harbor workers who load and unload cargo and
repair or supply ships, were excluded from state workers' compensation
remedies by the Court's 1917 decision in Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen.
68
Although those workers could bring general maritime law claims for
negligence against their employers if injured while on navigable waters,
69
they were often met with the "unholy trinity" of defenses, including
assumption of risk, contributory negligence and the fellow servant doctrine.
After a sputtering start,70 and perhaps motivated by a 1926 decision by the
Supreme Court holding that longshore workers qualified as "seamen" under
the Jones Act,7 1 Congress eventually enacted what is today known as the
Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act [LHWCA], 72 which
provides land-based maritime workers with a workers' compensation-like
remedy, in lieu of the negligence remedy such workers had under the general
maritime law. Significant amendments to the Act in 197273 eliminated the
longshore and harbor workers' general maritime law cause of action for
unseaworthiness against vessels74 and their owners and barred indemnity
actions by shipowners against stevedores for claims to injured longshore
68. 244 U.S. 205 (1917).
69. See Atlantic Transp. Co. v. Imbrovek, 234 U.S. 52 (1914) (distinguishing longshore
and harbor workers from seamen and denying their claims under the fourth proposition of The
Osceola, because they were not subject to the ship's discipline). A similar rationale is invoked
to bar claims by military personnel against the government under the so-called "Feres
doctrine." See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110, 112 (1954).
70. Congress' first attempt to provide longshore and harbor workers with a workers'
compensation-like benefit in 1917 by simply amending the "saving to suitors" clause to
include state workers' compensation acts was declared unconstitutional in Knickerbocker Ice
Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149 (1920). The second attempt, again by amending the "saving to
suitors" clause, was struck down in Washington v. W.C. Dawson & Co., 264 U.S. 219 (1924).
71. Int'l Stevedoring Co. v. Haverty, 272 U.S. 50 (1926). The Haverty negligence cause
of action against the employer was eliminated by the LHWCA, which now provides that
compensation benefits under the Act are the injured worker's exclusive remedy against the
employer. See 33 U.S.C. § 905(a) (2000). The exception to the rule concerns workers covered
by the LHWCA but who are employed directly by the shipowner. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp. v. Pfeifer, 462 U.S. 523 (1983).
72. Act of Mar. 4, 1927, ch. 509, 44 Stat. 1424 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§
901-950 (2000)).
73. Pub. L. No. 92-576, 86 Stat. 1251 (1972). See infra notes 74-77 and accompanying
text for discussion of the amendments' effects.
74. 33 U.S.C. § 905(b) (2000) ("The liability of the vessel ... shall not be based upon
the warranty of seaworthiness or a breach thereof at the time the injury occurred."). Claims by
covered workers for injuries caused by vessel negligence under 33 U.S.C. § 905(b) may be




workers caused by the stevedore's neglect.75 A 1984 amendment to
LHWCA's definition of a covered maritime "employee" eliminated
coverage for a number of workers who might otherwise be covered by the
Act.76 The LHWCA and decisions involving workers covered by the Act
played an important role in the evolution of the second proposition of The
Osceola because much of the development of the unseaworthiness remedy
arose in claims by injured longshore or harbor workers before the 1972
LHWCA amendments abolished such claims. 77
The path to coverage for ship-based maritime workers (the seamen) was
no more direct. No doubt intending to overrule the bar on negligence claims
established by The Osceola, in 1915 Congress enacted the Act to Promote
the Welfare of American Seamen, 78 Section 20 of which provided that: "In
any suit to recover damages for any injury sustained on board [a] vessel or in
its service seamen having command shall not be held to be fellow-servants
with those under their authority."
In Chelentis v. Luckenbach Steamship Co.,79 handed down just one year
after the Supreme Court's decision in Southern Pacific, the Supreme Court
struck again. Like seaman Shea in The Osceola, the injured seaman in
Chelentis made no claim that the vessel was unseaworthy, but rather argued
that the sole cause of his injury was an improvident order by a superior
75. 33 U.S.C. § 905(b) (2000). LHWCA renders any "agreements or warranties"
providing a right of indemnity against the injured longshore worker unenforceable,
eliminating the indemnity action permitted by the Supreme Court in Ryan Stevedoring Co. v.
Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp., 350 U.S. 124 (1956) and Cooper Stevedoring Co. v. Fritz Kopke,
Inc., 417 U.S. 106 (1974).
76. The definition of maritime "employee" in 33 U.S.C. § 902(3) was amended in 1984
to exclude six new categories of workers when such individuals are covered by a state
workers' compensation act. See Pub. L. No. 98-426, § 2(a), 98 Stat. 1639 (1984).
77. Although the 1972 LHWCA amendments foreclose unseaworthiness actions by
employees covered by the Act, arguably there remains a small group of workers who fall
outside the Act's coverage and who are not seamen, but may still fall within the class of
workers embraced by the Court's decisions in Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85
(1946) and Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406, 412 (1954) (extending Sieracki to a
ship repair worker injured aboard the vessel). See, e.g., Aparicio v. The Swan Lake, 643 F.2d
1109 (5th Cir. 1981). But see Normile v. Maritime Co. of the Philippines, 643 F.2d 1380 (9th
Cir. 1981) (holding that Sieracki was entirely overruled by 1972 LHWCA amendments).
78. Act of March 4, 1915, ch. 153, sec. 20, Pub. L. No. 63-302, 38 Stat. 1164, 1185
(1915). Section 20 was actually a small part of a comprehensive act promoting the welfare of
seamen. Credit for much of the 1915 Act goes to Wisconsin Senator Robert LaFollette, a
Progressive Party member who championed the rights of U.S. seamen.
79. 247 U.S. 372 (1918).
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officer.80 Chelentis argued that his negligence claim was cognizable under
the 1915 Act. 81 In denying the injured seaman's claim, the Supreme Court
held that the 1915 Act did no more than to address the third proposition in
The Osceola, the so-called fellow servant rule. 82 The 1915 Act failed,
however, to address the fourth proposition. Professors Gilmore and Black
characterize the Court's decision in Chelentis as one in which the Supreme
Court gave "Congress a lesson in '[hiow to read a case' of a type familiar to
any first term law student."
83
Congress' second attempt, in what is now known as the Jones Act,
84
amended Section 20 of the Act of March 4, 1920, to provide that:
Any seaman who shall suffer personal injury in the course of his employment
may, at his election, maintain an action for damages at law, with the right of
trial by jury, and in such action all statutes of the United States modifying or
extending the common-law right or remedy in cases of personal injury to
railway employees shall apply; and in case of death of any seaman as a result
of any such personal injury the personal representative of such seaman may
maintain an action for damages at law with the right of trial by jury, and in
such action all statutes of the United States conferring or regulating the right
of action for death in the case of railway employees shall be applicable.
Jurisdiction in such actions shall be under the court of the district in which
the defendant employer resides or in which his principal office is located.
The reference to the rights of remedies in cases of injuries to railroad
employees is understood to incorporate the Federal Employers' Liability Act
[FELA], 8 5 the constitutionality of which the Supreme Court had already
upheld.8 6 The relevant section of FELA provides:
Every common carrier by railroad while engaging in commerce between any
of the several States or Territories ...shall be liable in damages to any
80. Chelentis, 247 U.S. at 278-79.
81. ld. at 380.
82. Id. at 384.
83. GIuMoRE & BLACK, supra note 40, § 6-20, at 325.
84. Act of June 5, 1920, ch. 250, sec. 33, Pub. L. No. 66-261, 41 Stat. 988, 1007 (1920)
(codified as 46 U.S.C. app. § 688(a) (2000)). The statute had no formal title. It has long been
known as the "Jones Act," in honor of Sen. Wesley L. Jones (R. Washington), its principal
sponsor.
85. Act of April 22, 1908, ch. 149, Pub. L. No. 60-100, 35 Stat. 65 (1908) (codified at
45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (2000)).
86. Mondou v. New York, 223 U.S. 1 (1912).
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person suffering injury while he is employed by such carrier in such
commerce, or, in case of the death of such employee, to his or her personal
representative, for the benefit of the surviving widow or husband and
children of such employee; ... for such injury or death resulting in whole or
in part from the negligence of any of the officers, agents, or employees of
such carrier, or by reason of any defect or insufficiency, due to its negligence,
in its cars, engines, appliances, machinery, track, roadbed, works, boats,
wharves, or other equipment.
8 7
FELA expressly provides for vicarious liability of employers while
substituting comparative fault for the common law defenses of contributory
negligence and assumption of the risk. 88
In 1924, the Supreme Court, in Panama Railroad Co. v. Johnson,89
upheld the constitutionality of the Jones Act. The Court grounded its holding
on Congress' implied Article 11I legislative powers, not on the federal
commerce power. As the Court has recognized, the Article III power has
been given a more limited geographical application than has the commerce
power.9 0 As a result, it might be surmised that the Jones Act is applicable
only on waters subject to the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, even
though Congress could constitutionally extend its application to the full
reach of the Commerce Clause. However, the Supreme Court later held in
O'Donnell v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. that the constitutional
authority of Congress to modify the Jones Act derives from its authority to
regulate commerce, and that the Jones Act therefore not only statutorily
overrules the third and fourth propositions of The Osceola, it also provides a
remedy for any seaman injured in the course of his or her employment, even
if the injury occurred in a location where admiralty jurisdiction might not
otherwise apply. 9 1 The Jones Act, therefore, provides a remedy for some
87. 45 U.S.C. § 51 (2000).
88. 45 U.S.C. § 53 (2000) abolishes the contributory negligence defense, and 45 U.S.C.
§ 54 (2000) abolishes the assumption of risk defense in cases involving employer or fellow
employee negligence or violation of a safety statute. See also The Arizona v. Anelich, 298
U.S. 110 (1936) (holding that assumption of risk is not a defense to claims under the Jones
Act); Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. Smith, 305 U.S. 424 (1939) (holding that assumption of risk
is not a complete defense, but may operate to reduce seaman's recovery where conduct was
unreasonable).
89. 264 U.S. 375 (1924).
90. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 55 (1932) (holding that "[iun amending and
revising the maritime law, the Congress cannot reach beyond the constitutional limits which
are inherent in the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction") (citation omitted).
91. 318 U.S. 36, 40-43 (1943); see also Braen v. Pfeifer Oil Transp. Co., 361 U.S. 129,
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injuries that would not have been within the ambit of the general maritime
law rule in The Osceola.
Despite the "election" of remedies language in the Jones Act,92 the
Supreme Court has held that an injured seaman need not forgo the general
maritime law remedies of maintenance and cure for injuries caused by vessel
unseaworthiness to pursue the Jones Act negligence remedy.93 As a result, a
seaman may recover under all three theories, though of course, double
recovery is not permitted. The following section examines the judicial ebb
and flow on seamen personal injury remedies.
V. EVOLUTION OF THE OSCEOLA'S FIRST AND SECOND PROPOSITIONS
The century since the Court set out its four propositions for injured
seamen in The Osceola can be characterized as a period of episodic
evolution in the remedies available under the maintenance and cure rubric
and for injuries caused by vessel unseaworthiness, both of which survived
enactment of the Jones Act. Much of the evolution can be explained by
changes in the composition of the Supreme Court and the differing attitudes
of the justices to the two conflict dimensions identified earlier. 94
A. Evolution of the First Proposition: Maintenance and Cure
Maintenance and cure is a general maritime law remedy provided to
seamen who fall sick or are injured while in service of the ship. 95 "Cure"
132 (1959) (construing "in the course of his employment" to include injury to a barge worker
injured ashore while doing the work of his employer pursuant to employer's orders).
92. The statute's "election" feature was apparently an important factor in the Supreme
Court's decision upholding the Act's constitutionality. See Panama R.R. Co. v. Johnson, 264
U.S. 375, 388 (1924) (observing that the statute brings into the maritime law "new rules
drawn from another system and extends to injured seamen a right to invoke, at their election,
either the relief accorded by the old rules or that provided by the new rules") (emphasis
added).
93. McAllister v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 357 U.S. 221, 222 n.2 (1958) (concluding
that "[riecent authorities have effectively disposed of suggestions in earlier cases that an
injured seaman can be required to exercise an election between his remedies for negligence
under the Jones Act and for unseaworthiness") (citations omitted); lB BENEDICT ON
ADMIRALTY § 2, at 1-12 (Dale S. Cooper et al., eds., 7th ed. 1993). The Court similarly ruled
in Pacific S.S. Co. v. Peterson, 278 U.S. 130, 136-38 (1928), although the Court's treatment
of the unseaworthiness remedy in that case was ambiguous and probably dictum.
94. See supra Parts II.A & II.B.
95. To qualify, the injured worker must qualify as a "seaman," that is, the worker must
have an employment-related connection to a vessel in navigation. Maintenance and cure cases
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refers to the medical care provided to an ill or injured seaman, and
"maintenance" is the per diem allowance provided to recovering seamen for
food and lodging while undergoing treatment.
Much of the credit for the early development of the American general
maritime law of maintenance and cure set out in the first of The Osceola's
propositions must go to Joseph Story.96 In two seminal cases he authored
while on circuit, Justice Story drew on a variety of authorities to establish
what, at the time, must have been considered a progressive remedy for
seamen who fell sick or were injured while in service of the ship.
The first decision, Harden v. Gordon, has already been mentioned. 97 In
the second decision, Reed v. Canfield,98 Justice Story upheld a claim by a
seaman who suffered frostbite to his toes, which necessitated their
amputation and required medical care for approximately one year.99 The
seaman suffered the frostbite when caught in a snowstorm while ashore,
attempting to return to the vessel. 100 The vessel owner argued that the
obligation to provide maintenance and cure did not apply when the vessel
was in her homeport. 101 Justice Story rejected the argument, holding that the
remedy "embraces all sickness, and all injuries, sustained in the service of
the ship, and while the party constitutes one of her crew, without ... any
difference between their occurring in a home or in a foreign port, upon the
ocean, or upon tide-waters." 10 2 Justice Story went on to hold that "in service
of the ship" extended from the commencement of the voyage until the
seaman's discharge from the vessel. 10 3 To these decisions must be added
earlier authority holding that the seamen's maintenance and cure remedy
includes unearned wages, a remedy expressly recognized in The Osceola's
first proposition. 
104
are included in the annotations to 46 U.S.C.A. § 11102 (West 2002), the federal requirement
for certain U.S. vessels to carry "medicine chests" to enable them to provide immediate "cure"
to seamen injured at sea.
96. See generally George W. Healy III, Remedies for Maritime Personal Injury and
Wrongful Death in American Law: Sources and Development, 68 TuL. L. REv. 311 (1994).
97. See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
98. 20 F. Cas. 426 (C.C.D. Mass. 1832) (No. 11,641).
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 427-28.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 428.
104. See, e.g., Walton v. The Neptune, 29 F. Cas. 142, 142-43 (D. Pa. 1800) (No.
17,135) (suits for unearned wages of seamen who died due to fever while in service of ship).
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In a series of cases between 1938 and 1962, the Supreme Court
expanded the scope of the maintenance and cure remedy. In 1938, the
Supreme Court confronted the question whether the illness or injury for
which maintenance and cure was sought must be causally connected to the
seaman's service on the ship. The Court's decision in Calmar Steamship
Corp. v. Taylor 105 rejected any requirement for proof of a causal link,
holding instead that proof of an incapacitating injury or illness while the
seaman was in the service of the ship was sufficient. Five years later, in
Aguilar v. Standard Oil Co.,106 the Court held that the operative term "in
service of the ship" includes cases of illness or injury occurring while the
seaman was ashore in the course of departing on or returning from shore
leave. 107 Then, in Farrell v. United States,108 the Court extended the
remedy to injuries sustained by seamen while on shore leave and engaged in
activities unrelated to their duties on the vessel. 10 9
The Court in Aguilar also held that conceptions of contributory
negligence, the fellow-servant doctrine, and assumption of risk are not
defenses in claims for maintenance and cure. 110 Only "willful misbehavior
or deliberate act of indiscretion" bars recovery.111 In 1962, the Court held
that a seaman may recover attorneys' fees in cases where the shipowner's
"recalcitrance" forced the injured seaman "to hire a lawyer and go to court
to get what was plainly owed him."112 In that same decision, the majority
105. 303 U.S. 525 (1938).
106. 318 U.S. 724 (1943) (holding that the shipowner/employer has a duty to provide
maintenance and cure to a seaman who was struck by a vehicle ashore while returning to the
vessel).
107. Id.
108. 336 U.S. 511 (1949).
109. Id.; see also Warren v. United States, 340 U.S. 523 (1951). Although Farrell
gave a somewhat liberal interpretation to the phrase "in service of the ship," the decision is
perhaps better known for its conservative position limiting the entitlement to the point at
which the injured seaman reaches "maximum cure," even if the injury is a permanent one that
necessitates future, non-curative medical treatment. 336 U.S. at 519. The Farrell position was
later elaborated on by the Court's decision in Vella v. Ford Motor Co., 421 U.S. 1, 5 (1975)
(holding that maintenance and cure must be paid until the injury was declared to be
permanent). The Vella court expressly reserved the question of maintenance and cure
coverage for "palliative" care. Id. at 5 n.4.
110. Aguilar, 318 U.S. at 731.
111. Id. The Court cited, for example, injuries resulting from intoxication. Id. at
nn.11-12. Maintenance and cure may also be denied in cases where the seaman knowingly
concealed a pre-existing condition. See, e.g., McCorpen v. Cent. Gulf S.S. Corp., 396 F.2d
547, 548 (5th Cir. 1968).
112. Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527, 531 (1962).
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also held that the seaman's maintenance payments would not be reduced by
his earnings from another job he held while recovering, based in part on the
majority's conclusion that the seaman was "forced" to seek employment by
the employer's unreasonable failure to provide maintenance and cure. 113
Although the seaman's maintenance and cure remedy is sometimes
characterized as an implied contractual right, 114 the Supreme Court held that
it is "a duty that no private agreement is competent to abrogate."'115 The
maintenance and cure obligation (and liability) is imposed upon the
seaman's employer at the time of injury or when the illness manifests
itself. 116
B. Evolution of the Second Proposition: The Remedy for Unseaworthiness
The Supreme Court's development of the remedy for vessel
unseaworthiness is best understood if divided into three periods. 117 The first
period spans the years 1920 to 1950, when seamen generally relied on the
Jones Act as the principal legal theory for recovery. As the Court liberalized
and expanded the reach of the unseaworthiness remedy beginning in the
1940s, replacing what many thought was a due diligence standard with one
characterized as an absolute duty, seamen increasingly relied on the
unseaworthiness theory from 1950 to 1970. Following a partial retreat by the
Court in 1971, and Congressional amendments to the LWHCA in 1972, true
113. Id. The justices in the majority and the dissent disagreed over the question
whether the injured seaman took the intervening job voluntarily or because he was forced to
by the shipowner's refusal to pay maintenance. See id. at 534 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
114. Justice Story, in his decision on circuit in Harden v. Gordon, 11 F. Cas. 480, 482
(C.C.D. Me. 1823) (No. 6,047), characterized the seaman's right to maintenance and cure as
"an essential term in the contract."
115. De Zon v. Am. President Lines, Inc., 318 U.S. 660, 667 (1943).
116. Mahramas v. Am. Exp. Isbrandtsen Lines, Inc., 475 F.2d 165 (2d Cir. 1973). The
plaintiff in Mahramas was a hairdresser employed by an independent contractor that operated
a beauty shop on board a cruise ship. Id. at 167. In dismissing plaintiff's claims against the
shipowner for maintenance and cure and under the Jones Act, the court held that Mahramas's
in personam claims were available only against her employer, the contractor who operated the
beauty shop. Id. at 172. On the other hand, the unseaworthiness claim was properly lodged
against the shipowner (or the demise charterer, as the owner pro hac vice). Id.; see also
McAleer v. Smith, 57 F.3d 109, 119 (1st Cir. 1995) (dismissing "tallship" crewmembers'
claims against master of vessel for (1) unseaworthiness, because master was not a vessel
owner; (2) under the Jones Act, because the master was not the crewmembers' employer; and
(3) for negligence, because the general maritime law affords a seaman no cause of action for
injuries caused by negligence of the master or a fellow crewmrember, citing The Osceola).
117. See GuhMORE & BLACK, supra note 40, §§ 6-38 to 6-44.
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seamen turned to what may be characterized as the modem three-theory
approach, where both Jones Act negligence theories and unseaworthiness
theories are joined with a claim for maintenance and cure. As mentioned
earlier, growing judicial deference to the legislative branch and a
concomitant hesitation to further expand general maritime law remedies also
mark this latter period. 
118
The remedy for injuries caused by vessel unseaworthiness articulated in
the second proposition in The Osceola were vastly expanded by the Court
between 1944 and 1971, effectively eroding any distinction between
unseaworthy conditions and operational negligence. 1 19 In Mahnich v.
Southern Steamship Co.,120 Justice Stone held that the Court's decision in
The Osceola was correctly to be understood as holding that the duty to
provide a seaworthy ship does not depend upon the negligence of the
shipowner or the shipowner's agents, 12 1 thereby distinguishing the duty of
seaworthiness owed to seaman from the analogous duty owed to cargo.
122
118. See discussion supra note 4 and accompanying text.
119. Cases on unseaworthiness are collected in the annotations to 46 U.S.C.A. ch. 109
(West 2002) ("proceedings on unseaworthiness"). Chapter 109 codifies the current law on the
circumstances under which a seaman may lawfully refuse to proceed to sea, without forfeiting
his or her wages, on the ground that the vessel is unseaworthy. See 46 U.S.C. § 10904 (2000).
The chapter also provides for a penalty of up to $1,000 and imprisonment up to five years for
knowingly sending or attempting to send to sea an unseaworthy vessel that is likely to
endanger the life of an individual. 46 U.S.C. § 10908 (2000).
120. 321 U.S. 96 (1944). In the case, any claim by the plaintiff under the Jones Act
was barred by the three-year statute of limitations, thus limiting him to the unseaworthiness
theory. Id.
121. Id. at 102-03. In ruling that the duty to provide a seaworthy vessel was absolute,
Justice Stone apparently found a "ruling" in The Osceola "that the exercise of due diligence
does not relieve the owner of his obligation to the seaman to furnish adequate appliances." Id.
at 100. The closest support for Justice Stone's reading of The Osceola may be found in the
case of The Edith Godden, cited in the opening passage of the discussion of the seaworthiness
doctrine. In that case, district judge Addison Brown applied a standard of "the highest rule of
diligence and care in ascertaining the sufficiency of all such modern appliances for the
exigencies to which they are to be subjected." The Edith Godden, 23 F. 43, 46 (S.D.N.Y.
1885). But see Plamals v. The Pinar Del Rio, 277 U.S. 151 (1928) (reaffirming The Osceola's
exclusion of claims based on operational negligence).
122. Under the Harter Act and the Carriage of Goods By Sea Act, the carrier must
exercise "due diligence" to make a vessel seaworthy. See 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 191 [Harter Act]
& 1303(a) [COGSA] (2000). The statutory standard is in derogation of the general maritime
law rule. See The Niagara v. Cordes, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 7 (1858) (the duty of a common
carrier by water, in the absence of a contrary statute, is that of an "insurer").
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Two years later, in Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki,123 the Court extended the
duty of seaworthiness to longshore workers who "are doing a seaman's work
and incurring a seaman's hazards," 124 and at the same time described the
unseaworthiness duty as "absolute." 125 The Court extended the shipowner's
liability for unseaworthiness to conditions involving equipment brought
aboard the vessel by an independent contractor over which the owner had no
control in Alaska Steamship Co. v. Petterson.126 In Boudoin v. Lykes
Brothers Steamship Co.,127 the Court held that the unseaworthiness doctrine
imposed liability for injuries caused by what might be called "defective"
personnel. 128 Still later, in Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc.,129 the Court
upheld a seaman's claim for injury caused by a "transitory" unseaworthy
condition, 130 even though the condition arose after the vessel sailed from
(and then returned to) her homeport. 13 1 Writing for the Court, Justice
Stewart rejected the argument that liability for unseaworthiness would not
lie absent proof by the plaintiff that the slime and gurry that caused his fall
had been on the rail long enough for the defendant to discover and rectify
the condition. 132 He then reviewed the Court's earlier decisions and
characterized the duty to provide a seaworthy vessel as follows:
The duty is absolute, but it is a duty only to furnish a vessel and
appurtenances reasonably fit for their intended use. The standard is not
perfection, but reasonable fitness; not a ship that will weather every
123. 328 U.S. 85 (1946); see also Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406, 412
(1954) (extending the Sieracki duty of seaworthiness to a ship repair worker injured aboard
the vessel).
124. Sieracki, 328 U.S. at 99.
125. Id. at 94-95 (holding that the duty of seaworthiness "is essentially a species of
liability without fault . . . the liability is neither limited by conceptions of negligence nor
contractual in character").
126. 347 U.S. 396 (1954).
127. 348 U.S. 336 (1955).
128. Id.
129. 362 U.S. 539, 549 (1960).
130. The unseaworthy condition was a slippery rail created when the crew dripped fish
gurry on the vessel's rail while offloading the catch. Id. at 549.
131. Id. Therefore, the owner's duty owed to seamen to provide a seaworthy vessel is
temporally broader than the similar duty owed to cargo. See, e.g., Carriage of Goods by Sea
Act, 46 U.S.C. § 1303 (2000) (carriers owe shippers a duty to exercise due diligence to make
the ship seaworthy "before and at the beginning of the voyage").
132. Mitchell, 362 U.S. at 539.
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conceivable storm or withstand every imaginable peril of the sea, but a vessel
reasonably suitable for her intended service. 1
33
Thus, the vessel must be a "reasonably fit" place on which to work and
live. The obligation (and liability) is imposed on the vessel operator, who
may in some cases be different than the owner. In addition, injuries caused
by vessel unseaworthiness give rise to a maritime lien, enforceable against
the vessel in rem. In contrast to the standard of "slight causation" under the
Jones Act, the "proximate causation" standard applies to claims based on
vessel unseaworthiness. 134 As a result, the recently revived "superseding
cause" doctrine 13 5 may act to cut off the ship operator's liability for injuries
caused by vessel unseaworthiness in cases involving extraordinary
negligence by the plaintiff. Neither assumption of the risk nor contributory
negligence by the injured seaman bars a claim for unseaworthiness;
however, under the principle of comparative fault the seaman's recovery will
be reduced to reflect causative fault by the seaman.
In 1970, the Supreme Court first recognized a general maritime law
wrongful death remedy. The case, Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc.,
136
involved a longshore worker who suffered a fatal injury caused by an
unseaworthy condition on board a vessel moored in Florida territorial
waters. The Moragne remedy for deaths caused by unseaworthy conditions
on vessels on navigable waters (other than those waters covered by the
133. Id. at 550; see also Morales v. City of Galveston, 370 U.S. 165 (1962) (vessel on
which plaintiff was injured was not unseaworthy because it lacked a forced ventilation system,
which might have prevented plaintiffs inhalation of a fumigant).
134. See Ribitzki v. Canmar Reading & Bates, Ltd. Partnership, 111 F.3d 658, 662,
665 (9th Cir. 1997) ("even the slightest negligence" is sufficient to support a Jones Act
finding of negligence; however, causation in unseaworthiness claim is established by proof
that the unseaworthy condition was a "substantial factor" in causing the injury).
135. See Exxon Co., U.S.A. v. Sofec, Inc., 517 U.S. 830 (1996) (holding that
extraordinary negligence by plaintiff vessel owner's master following failure of mooring buoy
was a superseding cause of the vessel's eventual grounding, cutting off any potential liability
of parties responsible for allegedly defective mooring buoy). Because the proximate cause
standard does not apply to negligence claims under the Jones Act, the rule of superseding
cause should have no application to those claims.
136. 398 U.S. 375 (1970). Four years later, in Sea-Land Services, Inc. v. Gaudet, 414
U.S. 573 (1974), the Court held that the widow of a longshore worker was entitled to recover
non-pecuniary damages in the Moragne wrongful death cause of action for death caused by
vessel unseaworthiness. Because the 1972 LHWCA amendments eliminated the longshore




Death on the High Seas Act137) was later extended to true seamen in Miles
v. Apex Marine Corp. 138 The Court's 1971 decision in Usner v. Luckenbach
Overseas Corp.139 is seen by many as the first sign that the Court's
expansive period was over. 140 The following year Congress amended the
LHWCA, eliminating the longshore and harbor workers' claim for vessel
unseaworthiness.
VI. THE OSCEOLA'S CENTURY-LONG SHADOW
Before turning to the individual contributions to this Symposium, it may
be helpful to the reader to get a sense of the contemporary relevance of The
Osceola. The import of the case is, in part, a function of the broad reach of
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, which was long ago extended to the
Great Lakes and other navigable waterways, 141 and of the evolving legal
definition of "seamen."' 142 Like any century-old case, The Osceola must be
seen as a waypoint in the ongoing evolution of maritime law. The decision
reflects an effort to collect, synthesize and summarize the relevant law as it
stood, or as the Supreme Court saw it, in 1903. The first and second
"propositions" articulated by the Court in 1903 appear to be just as true
today, but only because they were cast in such general terms that the
"details" might undergo considerable development without undermining the
accuracy of the general proposition. While we must be mindful of Justice
Holmes' admonition that "general propositions do not decide concrete
137. 41 Stat. 537 (1920) (codified as amended at 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 761-768 (2000)).
DOHSA provides a remedy for wrongful deaths occurring on the high seas beyond one marine
league from the U.S. shore. 46 U.S.C. app. § 761 (2000).
138. 498 U.S. 19 (1990).
139. 400 U.S. 494 (1971) (distinguishing, however ambiguously, negligent operation
of seaworthy equipment from unseaworthy conditions on the vessel).
140. See also Victory Carriers, Inc. v. Law, 404 U.S. 202 (1971) (holding that
admiralty jurisdiction does not extend to a claim by a longshore worker injured on a dock
where injury was caused by equipment on the dock that was owned by the injured worker's
employer). The dissent was not persuaded by the majority's attempt to distinguish the Court's
earlier decision in Gutierrez v. Waterman Steamship Co., 373 U.S. 206 (1963) (upholding
unseaworthiness claim by longshore worker against vessel for injury caused in slipping on
spilled coffee beans on pier after the cargo was offloaded from vessel). Victory Carriers, 404
U.S. at 216-17 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
141. See, e.g., The Eagle, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 15, 25 (1869) (extending admiralty
jurisdiction to the Great Lakes); Fretz v. Bull, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 465 (1851) (extending
admiralty jurisdiction to the Mississippi River above the range of the tide).
142. See infra note 146 and accompanying text.
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cases,"'143 it seems clear that the first two of The Osceola's four propositions
have proved to be a durable standard for deciding thousands of seaman
personal injury cases, largely due to the fact that their generality has
accommodated progressive development and application of the law. 
144
That the Court's 1903 decision continues to cast a long shadow over
maritime personal injury law is demonstrated by even a brief examination of
the citators. Shepard's Citations lists well over 800 decisions, many of
which are recent, that cite The Osceola. Westlaw's "texts and periodicals"
database lists nearly 150 works citing the decision. In their admiralty
treatise, Professors Grant Gilmore and Charles Black observed:
The four propositions of The Osceola have been reproduced in hundreds of
cases as the classical statement of the liability of the ship and her owner to
sick and injured seamen. Like holy writ they are ritually invoked, respectfully
recited, rarely analyzed and never criticized. The facts of the case have been
lost from sight: even the admiralty casebooks merely reprint the four
propositions with no indication of the context in which Justice Brown
delivered his celebrated statement. 
145
At the same time it is important to note the functional limits of the case.
The Osceola concerned a claim by a seaman against his employer. The case
presented no question regarding Shea's status as a seaman, a vexing question
of classification that generated four recent decisions by the Court. 146 The
case does not speak to claims a seaman might have against third parties, such
as a product manufacturer or supplier, whose fault may have contributed to
the injury. It is also important to distinguish cases like Shea's involving
injuries to ship-based maritime workers (i.e., seamen) from those involving
land-based maritime workers, 147 and to distinguish claims by maritime
143. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
144. See generally JEROME FRANK, LAw AND THE MODERN MIND 11-12 (Coward-
McCann 1949) (concluding "that the widespread notion that law either is or can be made
approximately stationary and certain is irrational and should be classed as an illusion or a
myth").
145. GIumORE & BLACK, supra note 40, § 6-3, at 276.
146. McDermott Int'l, Inc. v. Wilander, 498 U.S. 337 (1991); Southwest Marine, Inc.
v. Gizoni, 502 U.S. 81 (1991); Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis, 515 U.S. 347 (1995); Harbor Tug &
Barge Co. v. Papai, 520 U.S. 548 (1997).
147. That said, it must also be acknowledged that much of the development in the
general maritime law of unseaworthiness took place in claims brought against vessels by
longshore and harbor workers before the 1972 LHWCA amendments eliminated those claims.
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workers from non-maritime workers 148 or other "nonseafarers" injured
outside the employment context. 149 A shipowner owes no duty of
seaworthiness to non-seamen, thus excluding claims based on
unseaworthiness by longshore and harbor workers, 150  visitors and
passengers aboard the vessel. 151 Liability in such cases turns on proof of
causative negligence under the general maritime law. 152 It must also be
borne in mind that The Osceola concerned a personal injury claim, not one
involving wrongful death.
Brief mention should also be made of the choice of law principles
applicable to claims for injuries to foreign seamen when brought in U.S.
courts. In 1982, Congress amended the Jones Act to eliminate coverage for
certain workers engaged in foreign offshore oil and gas operations.
153
Choice of law in claims by foreign seamen whose coverage was not
eliminated by the 1982 Jones Act amendment is governed by the Supreme
148. Generally, state workers' compensation benefits provide the exclusive remedy for
non-maritime workers who suffer injury in the course of their employment; however, such
workers may elect to bring a claim against their employer under the general maritime law if
the tort giving rise to the claim falls within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. See, e.g.,
Chan v. Society Expeditions, Inc., 39 F.3d 1398, 1403 (9th Cir. 1994) (reversing district
court's dismissal of injured employee's claim against employer under general maritime law
even though the worker was not a seaman, longshoreman or harbor worker); see also Rhodes
v. Washington Dep't of Labor & Industries, 700 P.2d 729, 731 (Wash. 1985) (holding that
injured worker who accepted state workers' compensation benefits is not barred from suing
employer under general maritime law).
149. The importance of the distinction between maritime and non-maritime plaintiffs
was recently highlighted by the Supreme Court's decision in Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A. v.
Calhoun, 516 U.S. 199 (1996), in which the Court upheld application of a state wrongful
death statute to a suit arising out of the death of a "nonseafarer."
150. See 33 U.S.C. § 905(b) (2000).
151. Kornberg v. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc., 741 F.2d 1332 (11th Cir. 1984) ("A
carrier by sea.., is not liable to passengers as an insurer, but only for its negligence"), cert.
denied, 470 U.S. 1004 (1985); Rainey v. Paquet Cruises, Inc., 709 F.2d 169, 172 (2d Cir.
1983) (holding that shipowner owes no duty to passenger to provide a seaworthy vessel;
liability must be founded on negligence).
152. Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625 (1959) (holding
that the owner of a ship on navigable waters owes to all who are on board for purposes not
inimical to the shipowner's legitimate interests the duty of exercising reasonable care under
the circumstances). For applications of the Kermarec rule to passenger cases, see Keefe v.
Bahama Cruise Line, Inc., 867 F.2d 1318, 1321 (11th Cir. 1989).
153. Pub. L. No. 97-389, § 503(a), 96 Stat. 1955 (codified at 46 U.S.C. app. § 688(b)
(2000)). The amendment precludes claims by such workers under the Jones Act or "under any




Court's seven-part choice of law test established in Lauritzen v. Larsen,154
and later supplemented with an eighth factor in Hellenic Lines Ltd. v.
Rhoditis.155 The result is that, by application of the eight-factor test, some
seaman personal injury claims adjudicated in U.S. courts will not be
governed by the maritime law principles that have descended from The
Osceola.
The Osceola and the Congressional response have left seamen with three
possible remedies, some of legislative origin and some grounded in general
maritime law. The duty to provide maintenance and cure is imposed upon
the seaman's employer, though the claim also gives rise to a maritime lien
against the vessel, 156 which the shipowner may ultimately be required to pay
in order to protect its interest in the vessel. The Jones Act claim does not
give rise to a maritime lien, 157 and, therefore, cannot be brought against the
vessel in rem, while the unseaworthiness claim confers a lien which can be
enforced against the vessel in rem. Where the vessel owner/operator and the
seaman's employer are not the same person or entity, the case can quickly
turn complex. Because there is ordinarily no right to a jury trial on admiralty
claims, the multiplicity of possible claims and defendants frequently raises
questions regarding jury trials in cases involving both law (statutory or
common) and admiralty claims, 158 particularly if the injured worker
attempts to join an in rem claim against the vessel with a claim for which the
seaman is entitled to a trial by jury.
159
154. 345 U.S. 571, 579 (1953). The factors considered include: (1) the place of the
wrongful act; (2) the flag of the vessel; (3) the domicile of the seaman; (4) the allegiance of
the shipowner; (5) the place of the contract; (6) the accessibility of the foreign forum; and (7)
the law of the forum. Id.
155. 398 U.S. 306, 309 (1970) (adding the defendant shipowner's base of operations
as the eighth factor).
156. Fredelos v. Merritt-Chapman & Scott Corp., 447 F.2d 435 (5th Cir. 1971). The
holding is plainly embraced by the language used in the first proposition of The Osceola.
157. Plamals v. The Pinar Del Rio, 277 U.S. 151 (1928).
158. See, e.g., Fitzgerald v. United States Lines Co., 374 U.S. 16 (1963); Romero v.
Int'l Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354 (1959). The Court held in Baltimore Steamship
Co. v. Phillips, 274 U.S. 316 (1927), that a seaman must join a Jones Act claim with a claim
for unseaworthiness, or the omitted claim is waived under the "bar" prong of resjudicata.
159. Compare Ghotra v. Bandila Shipping, Inc., 113 F.3d 1050 (9th Cir. 1997)
(affirming district court's jury trial of both in personam and in rem claims arising out of fatal
accident of marine surveyor brought in non-Jones Act case under court's diversity
jurisdiction), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1107 (1998), with Powell v. Offshore Navigation, Inc.,
644 F.2d 1063 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding that maritime personal injury plaintiff is not entitled




The contrast in protections afforded to seamen and shore-based maritime
workers covered by the LHWCA invites litigation over the injured worker's
status and has been the subject of frequent criticism. In a 1964 comment on
the post-Jones Act/LHWCA development of maritime personal injury law
for seaman and longshore workers, Professor Jo Desha Lucas quite correctly
observed that, for reasons of its own, Congress had chosen not to view the
entire maritime industry as a unit when it designed the respective personal
injury regimes. He then quipped:
It has followed the Supreme Court's distinction between shrimps and oysters.
A seaman is a shrimp, a free-swimming fish; the longshoreman is an oyster,
living in beds along the coast. Congress has cast its legislation to reflect this
difference. For a quarter of a century the Supreme Court has doggedly
refused to accept this distinction and has set about to bring equality of
treatment to workers in the shipping industry. 1
60
Less than a decade later, Congress effectively put an end to the Supreme
Court's "dogged refusal" to accept the distinction, by eliminating the
longshore worker's unseaworthiness action. In his contemporary treatise
Professor Schoenbaum concludes that the dual recovery system is
"arbitrary," "the distinction between land-based and sea-based maritime
workers is now devoid of significance," and that despite "cracks in the very
foundation of the system, Congress has avoided fundamental reform so the
courts as well as the maritime industry and their attorneys must struggle to
make sense out of the system as best they can."' 16 1 So long as the legislative
scheme remains out of balance, further evolution of The Osceola's four
propositions of general maritime law seems inevitable. It is therefore entirely
fitting that the authors of the three articles that follow this Introduction
scrutinize the Court's decision and its subsequent treatment.
160. Lucas, supra note 45, at 260. The analogy to the shrimp and oyster distinction
highlights the Supreme Court's differing approaches to state regulation of those fisheries in
Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948) (South Carolina law imposing differential license fee
on non-resident shrimpers held unconstitutional) and McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391
(1876) (Virginia law prohibiting non-citizens from planting oysters in Virginia tidewaters
held constitutional).
161. THoMAs J. SCHOENBAUM, ADMmALTY & MARITIME LAW, vol. I, § 6-9, at 272 (3d
ed. 2001).
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